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THE CASE FOR FEDERALIZING RULES OF 
CIVIL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITYt 
Peter Hay* 
I. THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN NON-UNIFIED FEDERAL 
SYSTEMS 
A. The Rationale for Federal Limits 
The European Community is an "incipient federal structure,"1 even if 
its scope of operation is limited in subject matter and its creation derives 
from "a network of treaties rather than [from] a formal constitution."2 A 
federal structure at once protects, even nurtures, pluralism and coordinates 
the constituent units in the interest of a union.3 Federal legislation pro-
motes the interests of the larger unit; a limitation of powers in the constitu-
tive document preserves the integrity of the members. In the American 
federation, the United States Supreme Court defines the balance between 
the reach of state and federal law. The balance, moreover, shifts over time 
as new or different concerns call for accommodation. In so doing, the 
Court not only deals with direct attacks on state or federal legislation or 
with problems of interpretation ( or gap filling) raised by new or different 
concerns, but also performs a creative function. In the fashion of a com-
mon law court, it develops the law either by creating "federal common law" 
or by declining to do so, in the latter case thus preserving or extending the 
applicability of state law. Even when it does develop federal common law, 
the Court may derive the new federal rule from state law rather than fash-
ioning one anew.4 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities renders binding de-
cisions in direct actions challenging the validity of Community legislation 
or administrative action,5 thus contributing to the definition and develop-
t It is with thanks and affection that I dedicate this essay to Eric Stein, who first 
introduced me to European Community law when he appointed me his research assistant in 
1957. His contribution to teaching and scholarship has been singular and has earned him the 
respect of the profession around the world. Many of us owe him much more: for his help and 
support in our personal and professional development and for his friendship over the years. 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Illinois; Honorary Professor, University of 
Freiburg i. Br., Germany. B.A., J.D. 1958, University of Michigan. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the research assistance of Stefan-M. Tiessen, of Germany. - Ed. 
1. Stein, Treaty-Based Federalism, A.D. 1979: A Gloss on Covey T. Oliver al the Hague 
Academy, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 897,901,905 (1919);seealso P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRA-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1-202passim (1966). 
2. Stein, supra note 1, at 901. 
3. See Hay, Full Faith and Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REv. 
709, 722-27 (1983). On unified versus non-unified federal systems, see id. at 724-25. 
4. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 133-48, particularly at 138-40 (1982). 
5. See generally G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
1323 
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ment of Community law. It can also render a preliminary ruling (under 
article 177 of the EEC Treaty)6 on the interpretation of a question of Com-
munity law when such a question is relevant to the decision of a case pend-
ing before a national court and that court has referred the question to the 
Court of Justice.7 In article 177 cases, the Court technically answers only a 
question put to it for purposes of a specific case pending in another (a na-
tional) court. However, "as the case law of the European Court becomes 
more abundant . . . national judges [may be expected] increasingly to fol-
low a similar approach whether the 'precedent' is to be found in a judgment 
in a 'direct action' or in a ruling of the Court under article 177."8 As in a 
common law system, the Court's influence thus extends beyond the particu-
lar case; its decisions serve as sources of Community law.9 
Technically, perhaps, interpretation of a statutory text and even gap fill-
ing (the latter deriving from some pre-existing legislative action) are differ-
ent from judicially declared rules of law (federal common law) in which a 
court takes the initiative. This difference, however, must not be overstated. 
In all cases, there must exist federal authority to adopt the statute, to extend 
a statutory rule through gap filling, or to bring a subject matter within the 
federal domain so that a federal rule can be fashioned for it. 10 The real 
difference between federal common lawmaking in the United States and in 
the Community may therefore lie in the respective extent to which there 
exists authority in the first place to extend the reach of federal law. 
The European Court has made some Community (federal) law, primar-
ily in the "constitutional" area. Thus, it "discovered ... [a supremacy 
clause] in the interstices of the new legal order," 11 undertook to extend the 
Community's treaty-making power, 12 declared the direct effect of direc-
tives, 13 and set itself up as "guardian of fundamental rights within the 
MUNITIES, Pt. 2B (1981); E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 
AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 145-69 (1976). 
6. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
7. G. BEBR, supra note 5, at 366; E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 5, at 
261-74. 
8. Lord MacKenzie Stuart & Warner, Judicial Decision as a Source of Community Law, in 
EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 273, 281 
(W. Grewe, H. Rupp & H. Schneider eds. 1981 ); see also Bebr, Preliminary Rulings of the Court 
of Justice: Their Authority and Temporal Effect, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 475 (1981); Hart-
ley, The Effects in National Law of Judgments of the European Court, 5 EUR. L. REV. 366 
(1980). 
9. Lord MacKenzie Stuart & Warner, supra note 8, at 281. 
IO. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 133-37. 
11. Stein, supra note I, at 902. The Court first articulated the supremacy doctrine in Costa 
v. ENEL (Case No. 6/64), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585 (Preliminary Ruling). Its most 
complete statement of the doctrine is now found in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 
v. Simmenthal S.p.A. (Case No. 106/77), 1978 Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629 (Preliminary Ruling), 
The U.S. Supreme Court similarly derives rules from the "principles of interstate federalism 
embodied in the Constitution," World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,293 
(1980), or, in the case of the act of state doctrine, bases the result on "'constitutional' under-
pinnings,'' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). 
12. Stein, supra note I, at 903; see also van Houtte, International Law and Community 
Treaty-Making Power, 3 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 621 (1981). 
13. G. BEBR, supra note 5, at 584-88. 
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Community legal order." 14 The Court's case law thus promoted the goals 
of integration and the efficacy of Community law, while simultaneously 
safeguarding individual rights against governmental action. 
These developments are not surprising. They define and refine the rela-
tionship of the Community to its members and the role of the Court in the 
constitutional framework. Once the nature of the Communities as incipient 
federal structures and the notion of treaty-based federalism 15 are accepted, 
it follows that Community public law will evolve as in any federal structure. 
Private law is the law of the individual states in the European Commu-
nity, as it is for the most part16 in the American union. An American17 or 
European common market, however, requires some coordination of private 
law, that is, of the legal business that goes on in constituent states. In the 
United States, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment sets 
outer limits on the exercise of state court jurisdiction and on a state court's 
freedom to apply local law to parties and to a cause of action with no or 
only minimal connection with the forum. 18 Further, the full faith and 
credit clause19 secures the free movement of judgments rendered by a court 
with proper jurisdiction. 
The Community has no due process clause. It sets no standard against 
which the exercise of state court jurisdiction (or the application of forum 
law) may be measured and, if improper, voided.20 A "full faith and credit" 
14. Id at 649; see also id at 649-57; note 96 1i!fra. 
15. Stein, supra note !,passim. 
16. Federal co=on lawmaking does affect some areas of private law in the United States, 
see E. SCOLES & P. HAY,supra note 4, at 137-48, but does not represent a comprehensive body 
of law. 
17. "In the Co=erce Clause, [the framers] provided that the Nation was to be a co=on 
market, a 'free trade unit' in which the States are debarred from acting as separable economic 
entities." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
18. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 79-102. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § l. 
20. In a sense, however, the Co=unity does achieve some results essentially similar to 
those that flow from the due process limitation in the United States. Thus, the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Co=ercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 
art. 3, para. 2, BULL. EuR. COMM., Supp. 2/69, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction and 
Recognition Convention] lists those jurisdictional rules (also known as "exorbitant" jurisdic-
tional bases) that may no longer be invoked in order to obtain jurisdiction over defendants 
domiciled within the Co=unity. Among these are jurisdiction based on the presence of 
property for a claim unrelated to that property (German Code of Civil Procedure, ZPO § 23) 
and the French nationality of a plaintiff suing a foreign defendant in French courts. The 
Convention is in force among the original six members of the Co=unities. The Accession 
Convention of 1978, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 304) 1 (Oct. 30, 1978) (not yet in force), 
provides for the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ratification will 
result in the addition of a prohibition on the exercise of jurisdiction by service of process upon 
a person (transient jurisdiction). On exorbitant rules of jurisdiction, see Weser, Bases of Judi-
cial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, IO AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 324-28 (1961). 
The prohibitions of article 3(2) do provide due process standards: even though contained 
in an interstate recognition convention, the prohibitions of article 3(2) are domestic law in each 
of the six original member states and thus bar the assertion of jurisdiction on one of the pro-
hibited grounds even when extrastate recognition is not in issue (for instance, when there exists 
local property sufficient to satisfy any judgment). Nevertheless, the prohibitions of article 3(2) 
are fixed. The American due process clause - with no fixed content - is perhaps more adapt-
able as different needs and problems of co=unity building evolve. It is perhaps the lack of 
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requirement, however, does provide that judgments rendered in the exercise 
of specified jurisdictional bases are entitled to recognition and enforcement 
in other Community countries.21 The proper assertion of jurisdiction thus 
is not a prerequisite for in-state validity under a federal due process stan-
dard as in the United States, but it is a prerequisite for mandatory22 out-of-
state recognition. 
The full faith and credit requirement is a matter of federal law in the 
United States and of Community law in Europe.23 And since the require-
ment of recognition and enforcement of a sister state's judgment depends 
on the rendering state's proper exercise of jurisdiction, this question -
what makes for jurisdiction? - itself becomes a question of federal law for 
recognition purposes. Were it otherwise, that is, if it were up to the individ-
ual state to specify the reach of its judicial jurisdiction, each state would be 
in a position to affect and define other states' obligations to recognize and 
enforce its judgments. Yet a full faith and credit requirement represents a 
federal ordering of the interstate common market in judgments. It follows 
that the precondition to the federal requirement cannot be left to the unilat-
eral action of those whose relations are to be ordered and whose divergent 
interests are to be accommodated. 
such a general device that underlies some of the problems with the proper interpretation of 
article 5(1). See text following note 40 infra. 
21. See Bartlett, Fu!! Faith and Credit Comes lo the Common Markel: An Analysis of tire 
Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and E,!forcemenl of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Mallers, 24 INTL. & COMP. L. Q. 44 (1975). 
22. Bilateral recognition conventions usually leave the treaty parties free also to recognize 
judgments rendered on jurisdictional bases other than those provided by the convention. See, 
e.g., London (July 1976) Draft of a proposed U.S.-U.K. recognition-of-judgments convention 
art. 3 (not in force) reproduced in Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Con-
vention Between tire United Slates and tire United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INTL. L.J. 421, 453 (1976), 
In the Co=unity, the Brussels Convention proscribes specified exorbitant rules of jurisdic-
tion (article 3), provides certain special jurisdictional bases in article 5 (e.g., for contract and 
tort), and establishes specific rules for insurance (articles 7-12), credit sales (articles 13-15), 
and cases of exclusive jurisdiction (article 16). Thus, there is no room for further discretionary 
recognition and, as mentioned earlier, less need than in the United States for additional con-
trols by means of a due process clause. See note 20 supra. 
23. Spellenberg, .Das Europaische Gerichtsslands- und J/o!lstreckungsiJbereinkommen als 
Kern eines Europaischen Zivilprozessrechls, 15 EuR 329, 339, 347 (1980), suggests that the Ju-
risdiction and Recognition Convention, supra note 20, does not represent "real" Community 
law but rather is a traditional international treaty, the interpretation of which should respect 
national interests and not intrude into concerns of national substantive law. This suggestion 
accords no or too little weight to the fact that the Convention represents the implementation of 
the mandate of EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 220, that "Member States shall •.. enter into 
negotiations . . . with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals: . . • the reciprocal 
recognition of judicial decisions .... " The Convention thus is very much part of the whole 
process of Co=unity building - a process that also explains why the 1971 Protocol on the 
Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments Con-
vention, June 3, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 6081 [hereinafter cited as Protocol], in force 
since September I, 1975 as among the six original members, confers jurisdiction on the Euro• 
pean Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Convention in a 
manner akin to proceedings under EEC Treaty article 177. See note 7 supra. See also text at 
notes 38-39 infra. 
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B. The U.S. and the European Experience 
In the United States, review of jurisdiction for full faith and credit pur-
poses is readily understood as involving a question of federal law,24 per-
haps because review ofjurisdictiongenerallj'-i.e., on due process grounds 
for in-state validity- is also an accustomed federal function. Federal re-
view for either purpose (due process or full faith and credit) does not neces-
sarily mean that a completely new rule will be fashioned.25 Rather, as 
mentioned earlier, an existing rule of state law may be adopted as the fed-
eral standard26 or state law may be left undisturbed - not because it "ap-
plies" of its own force but because the outer limits set by federal law as part 
of its interstate ordering function have not been transgressed.27 
The European Court similarly is called upon to interpret the Commu-
nity's full faith and credit requirement in the interest of the uniform inter-
pretation and application of the Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention 
(in response to a referral similar to one under article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty).28 However, it has an uneven record in giving a federal meaning to 
the jurisdictional prerequisites of that requirement. Thus, in tort, the Con-
vention provides for the recognition of judgments29 rendered in the state 
"where the harmful event occurred."30 The phrase was deliberately left 
ambiguous in order "to overcome a fundamental disagreement whether ju-
risdictional competence in tort cases should be accorded to the courts of the 
place where the defendant 'acted' or to those of the place where the plaintiff 
sustained injury (where these lie in separate countries)."31 The ambiguity 
could have been resolved by the Court in the same way in which it had 
dealt with the term "performance" in the contract section (to be discussed 
presently): leave it to the choice of law rules of the forum to localize the 
tort and recognize the exercise of jurisdiction by the state whose substantive 
law governs the tort. The result would have been - depending on the spe-
cific facts of a case - that one or two states, or even none, might have had 
jurisdiction. In any event, there would not have been a Community-wide 
24. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,231 n. 7 (1945) ("Since an appeal to the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause raises questions arising under the Constitution ... , the proper 
criteria for ascertaining domicile [the jurisdictional basis needed for ex parte divorce jurisdic-
tion], ... become matters for federal determination."); see also State ex rel White Lumber 
Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 130,448 P.2d 571, 575 (1968) ("[O]ne form of jurisdic-
tional allocation is found in the full faith and credit clause .... ") (O'Connell, J., dissenting). 
Cf. Wilson v. Kimble, 573 F. Supp. 501, 503 (D. Colo. 1983) (When the existence of diversity 
for federal jurisdiction depended on whether the minor plaintiffs domicile derived from her 
mother or her father, the determination had to be made "by reference to federal common 
laws.") (citing Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973)). 
25. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 138-40. 
26. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979) (discussed in E. 
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 139 n.9). 
27. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1945). 
28. See Protocol, supra note 23. 
29. The Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention, supra note 20, provides for jurisdiction 
- for most personal actions - in the state of the defendant's domicile (article 2), and then 
adds - for particular causes - "special" jurisdictional bases (articles 5-18). 
30. Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention, supra note 20, art. 5(3). 
31. l. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 125 (1982). 
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rule. The Court did not choose this course. Instead, it provided its own 
interpretation of the provision, thus substituting a uniform rule for poten-
tially divergent national approaches. The rule adopted does not select one 
of the two possible fora to the exclusion of the other, but rather - in keep-
ing with modem, plaintiff-favoring choice-of-law rules in tort32 - permits 
the plaintiff to sue in either state.33 Similarly, the Court has developed ex-
tensive case law on the requirements of article 17 permitting parties to enter 
into choice-of-court clauses,34 has held that a forum selection clause does 
not mean that the parties cannot also voluntarily submit to jurisdiction else-
where, 35 has defined quite clearly what constitutes a branch, agency, or 
other dependent establishment for purposes of jurisdiction under article 
5(5),36 and has brought maintenance claims between spouses within the 
scope of the Convention.37 
II. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN CONTRACT 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the European Court of Justice's deci-
sions show consistent efforts to establish uniform rules of jurisdiction as 
part of the mandate to accord recognition to judgments properly rendered. 
The Court stated that the Convention's mandates override inconsistent na-
tional law38 - a position consistent with its view of the supremacy of the 
EEC Treaty.39 It is all the more surprising, then, that the Court should 
have left the jurisdictional rules relating to contract in their present uncer-
tain state. " 
The provision at issue is article 5(1) of the Jurisdiction and Recognition 
Convention, which specifies that, in addition to being subject to suit at his 
32. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 605. 
33. See Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A. (Case 21/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1735 (Preliminary Ruling); McClellan, The Convention of Brussels of September 27, 1968 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Eeforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 228, 236 (1978). 
34. See McClellan, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Eeforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters in the European Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 268, 274 
(1979); McClellan & Kremlis, The Convention of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mallers, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 529, 547 
(1983). The Accession Convention of 1978 between the six original members and the three 
new members, not yet in force, contains amendments to article 17 relaxing the formal require-
ments contained in that provision and strictly construed by the Court. See Schlosser, Report 
on the Convention, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 71, 124 (Mar. 5, 1979). A second Acces-
sion Convention, adding Greece, was signed in October 1982, but is also not yet in force. See 
Convention on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 82/972/EEC, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM, 
(No L 388) l (Dec. 31, 1982); Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 97) 2 (Apr. 11, 1983). 
35. McClellan & Kremlis, supra note 34, at 552-53. 
36. Blanckaert & Willems PVBA v. Trost (Case No. 139/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
819 (Preliminary Ruling). 
37. De Cavel v. De Cavel (Case No. 120/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731 (Preliminary 
Ruling). . 
38. Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin (Case No. 25/79), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423, 3429 
(Preliminary Ruling); Duijnstee v. Goderbauer (Case No. 288/82), 1984 COMMON MKT. REP, 
(CCH) ~ 14,034 (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. Nov. 15, 1983), digested in 1983 ECJR 125. 
39. See note 11 supra. 
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domicile,40 a defendant may also be sued, "in matters relating to a contract, 
in the court for the place of performance of the obligation in question." 
Since bilateral contracts will involve obligations on both sides, one interpre-
tive problem concerns the definition of the relevant obligation. A further 
question is how the "place of performance" of the relevant obligation 
should be defined. 
A. -what is the Relevant "Obligation"? 
1. The Obligation at Issue in the Litigation 
In DeBloos v. Bouyer, 41 the Court of Justice held that the term "obliga-
tion" in article 5(1) refers to the contractual obligation forming the basis of 
the legal proceedings. It is the purpose of the Convention, the Court noted, 
not to permit situations in which a number of courts have jurisdiction in 
respect of one and the same contract. Thus, a forum should not have juris-
diction when. it has contact with just any obligation arising under the con-
tract in question, but only if the obligation to be performed in the forum is 
the one on which the plaintiff bases his claim.42 In DeBloos, a Belgian 
distributor sought compensation in a Belgian court from his French sup-
plier for terminating the distributorship agreement in violation of the Bel-
gian statutory notice requirement. What is the nature of his compensation 
claim: is it an "independent" (ie., primary) claim or is it ancillary to the 
notice requirement? That, said the Court in DeBloos, is a matter for deter-
mination by the national court under its conflicts rules. Under French con-
filcts law, Belgian law was applicable to the distributorship agreement. But 
Belgian law was unclear on the proper characterization of the claim, with 
the result that the tie-in between "obligation" and "performance" (to be 
discussed) might lead to contradictory results. If the obligation to provide 
compensation is independent, it has to be performed at the debtor's (sup-
plier's) domicile. In contrast, if it is ancillary to the main obligation to give 
notice, it - like notice - should have been performed at the distributor's 
domicile.43 
The Court's view has been criticized on several grounds. One argument 
is that splitting the contract into various obligations may bring into play the 
whole range of differences among national conflicts rules, since the law ap-
plicable to the contract will determine whether an obligation is to be char-
acterized as a primary or secondary obligation.44 National conflicts rules 
with respect to the sale of goods display at least four different approaches. 
40. See note 29 supra. 
41. (Case No. 14/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1497 (Preliminary Ruling). 
42. Both the German and the Italian Codes of Civil Procedure support this interpretation. 
See ZPO § 29; C.P.c. art. 20. While not determinative of the content of the "federal" standard, 
agreement in national law (or state law in the United States) may obviate the need for a differ-
ent federal rule. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
43. Ledoux, Les concessions de vente en Belgique et !es reg/es de competence de la CE.E. , 90 
JT 217 (1975). 
44. See Linke, Besondere Zustiindigkeiten: Vorbemerkungen, in DER INTERNATIONALE 
RECHTSVERKEHR IN ZIVIL- UND HANDELSSACHEN § 606, at 59 (A. Billow & K.-H. Bclckstiegel 
eds. 1983); Spellenberg, .Der Gerichtsstand des Erflillungsortes im Europiiischen Gerichtsstands-
und Vo/!streckungsiibereinkommen, 91 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ZIVILPROZESS 38, 51 (1978). 
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In France, Belgium and Italy, the Hague Convention of June 15, 1955 is in 
force which, in the absence of a contrary stipulation between the parties, 
refers to the law of the seller's habitual residence as governing the obliga-
tion.45 The Netherlands refers to the law of the place of contract forma-
tion,46 the Federal Republic of Germany applies the law of the place of 
performance,47 and the United Kingdom uses the proper law of the con-
tract.48 It is thus obvious that different fora may reach different conclusions 
when they consider where a "primary" obligation is to be performed. Illus-
tratively, if the Belgian court in JJeB/oos v. Bouyer49 had applied French 
law and if French law had characterized the claim as "ancillary," Belgium 
would have been the place where the principal obligation was to be per-
formed and its courts would have jurisdiction under article 5(1). If a Bel-
gian judge applying Belgian law were to arrive at an "independent" or 
"primary" characterization, neither Belgian nor French courts would have 
jurisdiction: each would consider jurisdiction to lie with the other. If one 
reverses the characterization (under French law the obligation is primary, 
while under Belgian law the obligation is secondary), a cumulation of 
courts with article 5 jurisdiction would result.50 
Similarly, there may be multiple fora or there may be none with article 
5(1) jurisdiction when money debts are involved. In Italy,51 the Nether-
lands,52 and the United Kingdom,53 a monetary obligation is to be per-
formed at the domicile of the creditor.54 The other members - France, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany - provide for performance at the 
debtor's domicile.55 A hypothetical may serve to illustrate: a German 
45. Convention of the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, June 15, 1955, 510 
U.N.T.S. 147 (1964). The Convention is also in force in Denmark, one of the states to accede 
to the Convention. 
46. 0. SANDROCK, I HANDBUCH DER INTERNATIONALEN VERTMGSGESTALTUNG 158 
(1980). 
47. 0. SANDROCK, supra note 46, at I 17. 
48. 0. SANDROCK, supra note 46, at 171; see also Droz, L'interpretation, par la Cour de 
justice des Comm11na11tes, des reg/es de competence judiciaire europeennes en matiere de contra/, 
1977 DALLOZ (Chronique) 287, 292. The same rule applies in Greece. See CODE CIVIL 
HELLENIQUE art. 25. 
49. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra. 
50. In its decision of May 3, 1977, the Belgian Cour d'Appel de Mons, 92 JT 637 (1977), 
held that the duty to pay damages constituted an independent obligation. This would ordinar-
ily have meant that jurisdiction lay with French courts. The Belgian court, however, affirmed 
its own jurisdiction because two of the three claims involved in the action bore a relationship 
to Belgium, and article 22 of the Convention permits connected claims to be decided by the 
same tribunal. This approach was subsequently disapproved in Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain 
(Case No. 150/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671 (Preliminary Ruling). 
51. C.c. art. 1182(3). 
52. B.W. art. 1429(2). 
53. See J. CHITTY, I CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ~ 1419 (25th ed. 1983). 
54. The rule is the same in Denmark, Lyngsp, General Law of Obligations, in H. GAM-
MELTOFT-HANSEN, B. GOMARD & A. PHILIP, DANISH LAW 119, 122 (1982), and probably also 
in Ireland, 0. SANDROCK, supra note 46, at 180. 
55. CODE CIVIL DE LA FRANCE art. 1247; CODE CIVIL BELGE art. 1247; CODE CIVIL DU 
LUXEMBOURG art. 1247; BOB § 269 (W. Ger.). The rule is the same in Greece. See CODE 
CIVIL HELLENIQUE art. 320. However, in Belgium, France, and Germany the Uniform Law on 
the International Sale of Goods is in force, as it is also in the Netherlands and the United 
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buyer sues an Italian seller in Germany for damages arising from an al-
leged breach of contract. Under the applicable German law, money debts 
have to be paid at the debtor's domicile. German courts, therefore, do not 
have jurisdiction. Italian courts also lack jurisdiction, if they apply Italian 
law and conclude that money debts are to be paid at the creditor's domicile. 
If, on the other hand, the German court had jurisdiction over the buyer's 
claim for damages and the seller sued for the contract price in Italy, the 
decision in .DeBloos56 would again result in an undesirable cumulation of 
jurisdiction. 
2. The Most Characteristic Obligation 
A number of authors suggest that money debts should be disregarded as 
"obligations," the performance of which confers jurisdiction within the 
meaning of article 5(1), precisely because money can be paid at so many 
different places. A principal reason for providing for jurisdiction at the 
place of performance of an obligation is the close connection between the 
performance and the availability of evidence, witnesses, expert opinions, 
and the like. Such a connection may not exist in the case of monetary 
obligations.57 
The suggestion that the obligation to pay money be excluded as a place 
of performance for jurisdictional purposes is very much in tune with con-
temporary developments in European conflicts law, which adopt references 
to the place of the "closest connection"58 or, in contract, to the place of 
performance of the obligation that is characteristic of the transaction.59 
The 1980 Convention of the European Communities on the Law Applica-
ble to Contractual Obligations (not yet rati.fied)60 takes the same approach. 
With respect to the topic under discussion, the two approaches coincide: in 
Kingdom. For cases involving transactions between parties in different member states, article 
59 provides for payment at the seller's place of business or, if there is none, at his habitual 
residence. See von Cammerer, Pjlichten des Kiiefers, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN 
KAUFRECHT 349, 361 (H. Dolle ed. 1976). 
56. See notes 41-43 & 49 supra. 
57. Linke, supra note 44, § 606, at 49; Spellenberg, supra note 44, at 56; Droz, Note, 65 
R.C.D.I.P. 120, 125 (1976);see also Schlechtriem,Auslegung und Liickenfollung im Internation-
alen Einheitsrecht: "Erflillungsort" for Rlickabwicklungspjlichten im EuGVU und EKG, 1 
IPRAx 113 (1981). Schlechtriem criticizes the reference to national law on the ground that it 
places an undue burden on debtors to have to bear the risk of Joss and delay in money trans-
fers as well as to be subject to jurisdiction at the creditor's place of business. See id. at 114. 
58. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 47; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des 
Internationalen Privatrechts, 3 IPRAx 254, 258 at art. 28(1) (1983) (German Draft Statute for 
the Reformulation of Private International Law) [hereinafter cited as German Draft Statute]; 
Hungarian Statute on Private International Law of 1979 § 25. 
59. See CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVIL art. 46 (Fr. 1976) (jurisdiction at the place of the 
characteristic obligation); German Draft Statute, supra note 58, art. 28(2); Switzerland: Draft 
Statute on Private International Law arts. 120-21, 42 RABELSZ 716, 739 (1978) (art. 115 of the 
1982 version of the Draft Statute); see also Austrian Statute of 1978, § 36, BUNDESGESETZ-
BLATT 1978, No. 304 at 1732-33. 
60. 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 266) 1 (Oct. 9, 1980), art. 4 [hereinafter cited as Contract 
Choice of Law Convention]. For discussion, in the context of an earlier draft, see d'Oliveira, 
"Characteristic Obligation" in the Dreft EEC Obligation Convention, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 303 
(1977). 
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most cases the payment of money is not characteristic of the contract61 and, 
as a result, does not have the close connection to the forum that is the prem-
ise underlying article 5(1). Adoption of a "characteristic obligation" ap-
proach62 by the European Court of Justice would have the advantage that 
all litigation with respect to the contract would be concentrated at the place 
where the characteristic obligation has to be performed. It is a separate 
question whether the definition of this criterion should be left to national 
courts or be undertaken by the Court itself. As stated initially,63 the defini-
tion of jurisdictional standards for recognition purposes is a federal func-
tion. The Court should either undertake such a definition or, as in other 
cases,64 perform its federal function through its oversight in referral cases. 
B. Place of Peiformance 
I. The National Law Interpretation: The Shortcomings of Tessili 
Further uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of the "place of 
performance" in article 5(1) adds to the confusion. In Tessi/iv . .Dunlop,65 
tjie European Court of Justice held that that phrase is to be interpreted by 
reference to the law applicable to the contract as determined by the conflicts 
law of the forum. National laws differ considerably in their definition of 
the place ofperformance.66 Thus, there was no way to find a common solu-
tion and the definition of a community rule may have been rejected as an 
alternative because its substitution for the rules of national law may have 
been considered inappropriately intrusive.67 
A principal substantive argument advanced in support of the national-
applicable-law approach of Tessi/i (the "lex causae" solution) is the concern 
61. See E. ScoLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 696-98 and references cited therein. 
62. Droz,supra note 57, at 125; Huet,Note, 104 CLUNET 714, 717 (1977); Linke,supra note 
44, § 606, at 59; Spellenberg, supra note 44, at 56, 58. 
63. See text at notes 23-27 supra. 
64. See, e.g., Martin Peters Bauuntemehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers 
Vereniging (Case No. 34/82), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 987 (Preliminary Ruling) (obligation 
of a member of an unincorporated association to pay money is an obligation within the mean-
ing of article 5(1) even if it derives from a decision by the association rather than from the 
membership agreement). For criticism see the annotation by Schlosser, Europaisch-autonome 
lnterpr~lation des Begr!lft "Vertrag oder Anspr/Jche aus einem Ver/rag" i.S. v. Ari . .5 Nr. 1 
EuGVU?, 4 IPR.Ax 65 (1984). 
65. Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 12/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1473 (Preliminary Ruling). 
66. In Belgium (CODE CIVIL arts. 1247, 1609), Denmark (Lyngs~. supra note 54, at 121), 
France (CODE CIVIL arts. 1247, 1609), Greece (CODE CIVIL art. 320), Germany (BGB § 269), 
Italy (C. c. art. 1182(4)), the U.K. (see J. CHITTY, supra note 53, at~ 1419), and Ireland (Sale 
of Goods Act § 29(2)), the place of performance for delivery of goods is at the debtor's domi-
cile. In the Netherlands, goods have to be delivered at the creditor's domicile. B.W. arts. 
1429(2), 1513. However, the determination of the domicile in point of time differs: it is the 
domicile of the time of contract formation in Germany and the Netherlands, but the domicile 
at the time of performance in Belgium, France and Italy. Special rules apply when goods are 
unique. See generally ~~hlosser, Vertragsautonome Auslegung, nationa!es Recht, Rechtsver• 
gleichung und das EuGVO, in GEDACHTNISSCHRIFf FUR RUDOLF BRUNS 45-56 (J. Baltzer, G. 
Baumgartel, E. Peters & H. Pieper eds. 1980); Spellenberg, supra note 23, at 59. 
67. Martiny, Autonome und Einheitliche Aus!egung im Europiiischen Internationa!en Zivil• 
prozessrecht, 45 RABELSZ 427, 434 (1981). 
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that an autonomous concept of the place of performance might lead to a 
place which, in fact, differs from the real place of performance. In the view 
of some authors, this would defeat the reason for providing an alternative 
to domiciliary jurisdiction at the place where the performance of the obliga-
tion and any proceedings concerning it come together.68 In addition, the 
government of the United Kingdom maintained in its statement in Tessi!i69 
that a Community definition of the place of performance would, for practi-
cal purposes, determine that place as a matter of substantive law of con-
tract, to be applied as such in all member states. Given existing differences 
in national law, such a Community definition, the argument goes, could 
result in a change in the law of some, perhaps all, of the member states. 
The effect of the ruling would extend to all aspects of performance of con-
tracts of the type in question and would have repercussions even beyond 
the performance of the contract. It would extend to those other aspects of 
the law that are directly or indirectly linked with performance. Moreover, 
the question of where performance is to take place would call for a separate 
answer for every type of contractual relationship, and would in every in-
stance ultimately be a matter for referral to the Court of Justice. Serious 
uncertainty would be introduced into the law.70 
Adoption of a Community meaning need not affect substantive law. 
Each state remains free to define the place of performance for substantive 
law purposes.71 That, then, leaves the question of "harmony" between sub-
stantive law and the law of jurisdiction, on the one hand, and between 
choice-of-law rules and the law of jurisdiction, on the other. There is, of 
course, no magic - no necessity - in such harmony. The American expe-
rience (which indeed seems relevant72) shows that contacts for jurisdiction 
may well differ from those relevant for the determination of the applicable 
law.73 Moreover, it may well be - as the concluding comments will try to 
show - that the elaboration of tight independent (Community level) juris-
dictional standards may ultimately promote "harmony" between jurisdic-
tional and applicable law. Standards in substantive law, finally, may still 
differ from those in jurisdictional law. But if, as a result of "harmony" 
between jurisdiction and applicable law, the forum neither has jurisdiction 
68. See, e.g., R. GEIMER & R. SCHUTZE, 1 INTERNATIONALE URTEILSANERKENNUNG 563 
(1983); Basedow,Europiiisches Zivilprozessrecht, in 1 H.J. HERRMANN, J. BASEDOW & J. KRo-
PH0LLER, HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS § 45 (1982); Geimer, 
Zur Auslegung des BrfJsseler Zustiindigkeits- und Vol/streckungsuhereinkommens in Zivil- und 
Handelssachen vom 27 September 1968, 12 EuR 341, 356 (1977); Kropholler, Internationale 
Zustiindigkeit, in 1 H.J. HERRMANN, J. BASED0W & J. KROPHOLLER, supra at§§ 670, 355 
(1982); Schultsz, Zwischenhilanz des europiiischen Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsiiher-
einkommens, 3 IPR.Ax 97, 99 (1983); Schlosser, supra note 66, at 57. 
69. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1479, 1480. 
70. See also Schultsz, supra note 68, at 99; Schlosser, .Der EuGH und das Europiiische Ge-
richtsstands· und Vol/streckungslihereinkommen, 30 NJW 457, 459 (1977). 
71. See Huet, supra note 62, at 716. 
72. See text at notes 96-97 infra. 
73. See Linke, supra note 44, at 51; Liideritz, Fremdhestimmte internationale Zu-
sliindigkeit?, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 233, 241, 242 (H. Bernstein, u. 
Drobnig & H. Ktltz eds. 1981); Submission of the Gov. of the Fed. Republic of Germany in 
Tessili v . .Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1477, 1479. 
1334 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1323 
nor furnishes the applicable law, what difference does the content of its 
substantive law make in the particular case? 
The history74 of article 5(1) shows that the choice of the place of per-
formance was a compromise.75 This choice was made to introduce a stable 
criterion for jurisdiction.76 The provisions will not achieve that objective 
when the place of performance may point in as many different directions -
as a result of national law divergencies - as do the various definitions of 
"obligation" discussed above. Instead, a "European answer"77 is required. 
2. Ivenel v. Schwab: A Change of Heart? 
In Case 133/81,Ivenel v. Schwab,18 the plaintiff, who resided in France, 
sued his German employer in France for sums due, including commissions, 
after his employment was terminated. Under .DeB!oos 19 there should not 
have been jurisdiction in France because the obligations - although there 
were several - all ran from the defendant to the plaintiff and, under both 
German and French law,80 were payable at the debtor's address. The 
Court of Justice observed that one purpose of article 5(1) was to give juris-
diction to a court with a close connection to the case,81 added that article 6 
74. "One case where 'travaux preparatoires' are regularly referred to is the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters." Lord Mackenzie Stuart,lntroductory Talk, Visit of the Court of Human Rights, Luxem• 
bourg, 29 April 1983, at 9 (mimeo). 
75. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 59) I, 23 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Jenard Report]; G. DROZ, COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET EFFETS DES JU0EMENTS DANS 
LE MARCHE COMMUN: ETUDE DE LA CONVENTION DE BRUXELLES DU 27 SEPTEMBRE 1968, at 
57, 58 (1972). 
76. G. DROZ, supra note 75, at 57, 58; Linke, supra note 44, at 56; Linke,Anmerk1111g, 23 
RIW / AWD 43, 44 (1977). 
77. Pescatore, Le Recours, dons la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautes 
Europeennes, a des normes deduites de la comparaison des droits des etats membres, 32 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 337, 344 (1980); see also R. SCHUTZE, lNTERNATIO· 
NALES ZIYILPROZESSRECHT 74 (1980); M. WESER, CONVENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE SUR LA 
COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET L'EXECUTION DES DECISIONS 248 (1975); Jeantet, Un droil 
europeen des co,iflits de competence judiciaire et de /'execution des decision en maliere civile el 
commerciale, 1972 CAH. DR. EUR. 375, 388. 
78. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1891 (Preliminary Ruling). For discussion, see Mezger, 
Einheillicher Gerichtsstand_~es ErjlJl/ungsorls verschiedenartiger Ansprliche eines Ha11delsver-
trelers (Article 5 Nr. 1 GVlJ), 3 IPRAx 153 (1983). 
79. (Case No. 14/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1497. 
80. McClellan & Kremlis, supra note 34, at 540. 
81. The Court had made the same point in an interesting earlier decision. See Zeiger v. 
Salinitri (Case No. 56/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 89 (Preliminary Ruling). In this case, 
the parties had agreed orally that Munich should be the place of performance. The question 
was whether this agreement made for jurisdiction in Munich under article 5(1), even though 
article 17 requires that forum selection clauses be in writing. The Court noted that article 17 
permits the selection of any court, without regard to a connection between it and the transac-
tion, while article 5(1) provides for jurisdiction at a place where there is a direct link to the 
transaction. If the parties structure their transaction so as to bring about a close connection to 
the particular place, the objectives of article 5(1) are fulfilled. The protection against over• 
reaching that the formal requirements of article 17 provide then is no longer needed and juris-
diction may be exercised at the place of the (stipulated) performance. 
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of the Contract Choice of Law Convention82 applies to employment con-
tracts the law of the country where the employee habitually does his work, 
and then concluded that for claims arising out of employment contracts, the 
close connection for jurisdictional purposes is at the place whose law gov-
erns the contract. That law, in tum, "is determined by the obligation 
characterising the contract ... and is normally the obligation to carry out 
work."83 
Employment contracts have long had a special place in conflicts law, 
perhaps even earlier in Europe than in the United States. This importance 
was the result of concern over providing protection for the weaker party. 
Experience has been similar in insurance contracts. However, by the same 
token, there is something special about all contract types - hence the grow-
ing importance for choice-of-law purposes of the place where the character-
istic obligation is to be performed. 84 Particularly for those who seek 
"harmony" between jurisdiction and choice of law,85 an interpretation of 
article 5(1) along these lines should suggest itself as natural. 
The suggestion, by implication, is that the Court should opt for the char-
acteristic obligation approach in dealing with "obligation" and "place of 
performance" under article 5(1). This is not the only possibility, of course. 
The Court could also select one of the national rules, such as section 29 of 
the German Code of Civil Procedure, which is said to have been a model 
for article 5(1).86 However, suggestions in the literature87 favor the "char-
acteristic obligation" approach, as does newer legislative reform.88 Adop-
tion of this approach would also have the advantage of eliminating from 
the range of jurisdictional alternatives the place of payment of a money 
debt. This effect is especially desirable when such payment is to occur at the 
creditor's address since it would then also accord with the Convention's 
objective to eliminate the forum actoris (exorbitant jurisdiction).89 
All this said, however, it is important to remember that Ivene/90 was an 
employment case and that, despite the generally applicable rationale which 
underlies that decision, the Court of Justice has said nothing expressly that 
would indicate a wider reach, let alone signal a general departure from (the 
82. See note 60 supra. 
83. lvenel, 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1900. 
84. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text. 
85. See notes 68 & 71 supra. 
86. Jenard Report, supra note 75, at 23. 
87. Linke,Anmerkung, supra note 76, at 45; Spellenberg, Die Vereinbarung des Erjhllungs-
ortes und Article 5 Nr. I des Europaischen Gerichlsslands- und Vollstreckungsiibereinkommens, 3 
IPR.Ax 75 (1981). 
88. See note 59 supra. 
89. Droz, supra note 57, at 125. See also Stoll, Gerichlsstand des E,jlillungsortes nach Art. 5 
Nr. I EuGV[/ bei slrilligem Vertragsschluss, 3 IPRAx 52, 54 n.16a (1983) who notes the ten-
dency of national courts to define jurisdiction at the place of performance as "a 'one-way 
street' leading to the courts at the domicile of the plaintiff .... " [author's translation - Ed.). 
Since the basic rule of the Convention (article 2) provides for jurisdiction at the debtor's domi-
cile, "the exception of article 5(1) should not entail the result that, contrary to the basic rule, 
the debtor may routinely be sued at the plaintiff's domicile for certain categories of contract 
claims." Id. at 54 [author's translation - Ed.). 
90. (Case No. 133/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1891; see text at note 78 supra. 
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"overruling" of) .DeB/oos.91 Indeed, Ivene/ has been criticized: "[T]he 
.DeB!oos decision appears to be the most realistic in the light of the wording 
of article 5(1) [' ... the place of performance of the obligation in question') 
which makes no distinction between contracts of employment and other 
contracts."92 True, but neither does the wording require that the definition 
of "obligation" and "place of performance" be determined by national law. 
Instead, the suggestion is that the characteristic obligation approach, qua 
Community definition, be extended beyond employment contracts. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Advocate-General Warner gave an impressive list in his submissions in 
a 1980 case93 of the many instances in which the Court has opted for an 
independent interpretation. In general, that trend continues.94 This is as it 
should be if the legal integration, which article 220 of the EEC Treaty and, 
in implementation, the Brussels Convention have as their objective, is to be 
achieved.95 
Both the United States and the Community are non-unified legal sys-
tems. Beyond the subject matter of delegated federal (Community) powers 
or those areas touching upon federal concems,96 there is no general law-
making power on the federal level, either for making substantive private 
law or for establishing choice-of-law rules. With respect to the latter, there 
are some minimal federal constitutional limitations in the United States.97 
Even these do not exist in the Community to the same extent. An earlier 
attempt to unify choice-of-law rules for tort and contract by convention 
failed,98 and the current (1980) convention unifying only contracts choice-
of-law rules has, so far, received only one ratification (France).99 
It is against this background of substantive and conflicts law divergence 
that jurisdictional standards must receive federal/Community-level defini-
91. (Case No. 14/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1497. 
92. McClellan & Kremlis, supra note 34, at 542. 
93. Netherlands State v. Ruffer (Case No. 814/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 3807, 3833 
(Preliminary·Ruling). 
94. See Ivenel v. Schwab (Case No. 133/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. l891;seealso text 
at notes 78-83 supra. 
95. See Linke, Anmerkung, supra note 76, at 44. 
96. When federal concerns are implicated, the United States federal courts have limited 
power to make co=on law. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 133-48. The existence and 
extent of similar power in the Court of Justice, as distinguished from the legislative self-
a.mendment possibility offered by EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 235, is at best uncertain and, 
in any event, largely unexplored. But there are beginnings: "[The decision in AM & S Europe 
Limited v. Co=ission (Case 155/79), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1575] is ... important •.. 
also for the reason that, I think for the the first time, the Court, having deduced an unwritten 
principle of Co=unity law from a study of the comparative law of the Member States, has 
invoked it to limit the application of what would otherwise be the unqualified terms of a 
Co=unity regulation .... " Lord Mackenzie Stuart, supra note 74, at 13; see also Goffin, 
Observations [on the AM & S Case], 18 CAH. DR. EUR. 391, 394, 405 (1982). 
97. See Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644 (1981). 
98. Unofficial translation in 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (1973); see EUROPEAN PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATION (0. Lando, B. von Hoffmann & K. Siehr eds. 1975). 
99. Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 80/934/EEC, 23 O.J. 
EUR. COMM. (No. L 266) I (Oct. 9, 1980). 
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tion, if there is to be a basis for mandatory recognition and enforcement of 
judgments. Litigation at the place of the closest connection will prevent 
forum shopping, just as uniform substantive and conflicts law will lead to 
predictable results. To accomplish these aims, however, the definition of 
the jurisdictional standards cannot be left to the individual units that are to 
be integrated. 
Will the suggested federal/Community-level definition of jurisdictional 
standards then result in a greater, and perhaps undesirable, divergence be-
tween them and choice-of-law standards? In the United States, minimal 
contacts to the forum have been accepted for the sake of the plaintiff's con-
venience in the choice of forum. In a system with a federal due process 
prescription it should follow - but has not as fully as some would wish -
that a much closer connection of the forum to the transaction or the parties 
should be required before the forum may apply its own law. 100 Europe 
lacks this kind of express due process provision. The Jurisdiction and Rec-
ognition Convention, however, provides an analogue: specific jurisdic-
tional provisions to be interpreted on the Community level. An evolution 
of a jurisdictional standard that localizes litigation at the place of the closest 
connection or the characteristic obligation should, in logic, often lead to the 
application of forum law. If national choice-of-law rules continue to evolve 
toward similar tests (even without the benefit of a Choice-of-Law Conven-
tion), Europe may have a measure of harmony between choice-of-law and 
judicial jurisdiction long before the United States. 
100. See Hay, supra note 97. 
